I
was originally going to write about free-trade this week. However, the
spectacle at the UN General Assembly offered instructive hints about a
thawing between Iran and the Western nations.
Historically,
the beginning of tensions between Iran and the United States began when
the United States orchestrated a coup to overthrow Iran’s elected
leader Mohammad Mosaddegh and the consolidation of power by the Shah
Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi was then overthrown in 1979 during the Iranian
Revolution, which installed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the supreme
leader of Iran. Iranian-American tensions have been tense since the
Revolution, such that until Friday, the president of the United States
and the president of Iran had never communicated by phone.
Pro-reform
presidents have been elected in Iran, most notably Mohammad Khatami,
who was in office from 1997 to 2005. Unfortunately, none have been able
to break fundamental deadlock in Iran-American relations. Ultimately,
the current Ayatollah Ali Khameini took negotiating power away from
Khatami, and ultimately Khatami was replaced by the fundamentalist,
Holocaust-denying Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
What
we have now is a situation where both Iran and the United States want
peace and stability, but neither quite trust the other to deliver, and
with both sides containing anti-detente factions. In the United States,
President Barack Obama definitely wants normalized Iran-US relations.
However, Obama is proceeding cautiously to avoid angering opposition
Republicans, who could accuse him of being soft towards the Iranian
regime. In addition, Obama’s quest for peace has been complicated by
Israel, most notably Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Since
Obama’s ascension to the presidency, his relations with Netanyahu have
been strained, and Netanyahu has publicly voiced cynicism regarding
possible negotiations with the Iranian government.
Before
discussing the political situation Hassan Rouhani, the new president of
Iran, finds himself in, I’ll briefly describe the election that brought
him to power. Rouhani was one among eight candidates “approved” by
Ayatollah Khameini to run in this year’s presidential election.
Originally one of two “moderates” running; the other moderate, Mohammed
Aref, dropped out early and endorsed him. Rouhani went on to win a
surprise 51% majority in the first round of balloting, enough to avoid a
runoff. This result indicates that perhaps Iranians have had enough of
the current norm of economic sanctions and inflammatory rhetoric, and
wish to be more open to the country. Iranians as a whole are more
affluent and better educated than other areas in the Middle East outside
of Israel. They also are more moderate towards Western culture than
many other areas in the Middle East.
That
said, the main reason I think Rouhani can bring about negotiations in a
way Khatami did not is that he is overall a better political
strategist. He has spent several years inside the government, most
notably as head of a negotiating team in charge of working in the West
to halt the Iranian nuclear program. while Khatami fell from favor, thus
paving the way for Ahmadinejad to take power, Rouhani has maintained
close cooperation with Khameini. As such, he will be able to make
politically more risky moves than Khatami was.
Of
course, the problem with this scenario is this: the office of president
has relatively little power in Iran; most power ultimately resides with
Khameini. And there is no guarantee that Khameini wants better
negotiations with the West and with Israel. But consider this: the value
of the Iranian rial dropped 80% between 2011 and 2012, and oil exports
have similarly plunged. Sooner or later Khameini would end up
cooperating, lest he fall as the Shah did due to political discontent.
We may be seeing the fruits of the economic sanctions that took effect
2-3 years ago.
Of
course, there are still hard-line factions within the Iranian
government, such as the Revolutionary Guards, who are still staunchly
opposed to improved relations with the West. It will be Rouhani’s job to
maneuver through the hardline elements of the Iranian government to set
up better relations. Early indications are that he is succeeding.
Of
key importance in the negotiations with the new government of Iran will
be Iran’s nuclear program. Despite Iranian claims that their program is
solely for nuclear power, political leaders in both the United States
and Israel will still insist on a halt of uranium enrichment operations
by the Iranian government.
It
is really hard to determine conclusively whether or not Iran is in fact
trying to manufacture a nuclear weapon. According to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the Iranian centrifuges have only produced a
handful of 20% enriched uranium, well below the 80-90% required to
synthesize a nuclear weapon. In addition, much of the uranium they do
have is being converted into uranium oxide rods, which cannot be easily
enriched.
The
proposition Rouhani made at the UN General Assembly meeting last week
is interesting- he called for Israel to enter into an accord with Iran
where both sides would agree not to develop nuclear weapons. Israel
still has not “confirmed” that they have nuclear weapons, but it is very
certain that they do. Along with Iran, they have not signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a smart debating point for Rouhani,
knowing that the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, will be
forced into a spot. Netanyahu is loath to weaken his bargaining position
with Iran (he has repeatedly threatened to bomb Iran should they
continue with their nuclear program), yet at the same time should he
reject this olive branch, he will look overly hostile to the new
government.
One
argument made is that Israel should not make nuclear concessions to
Iran. Frankly, I think this attitude is silly. Netanyahu has made
threats to bomb Iran, and it would make sense for Iranians to fear a
preemptive Iranian strike. Deterrence seems to be a reasonable argument,
until you realize that each side wants to deter the other. This has the
potential to lead to a cold-war type conflict, with each country
developing increased nuclear capability. this would leave both countries
vulnerable either to some sort of breach of intelligence or to a
terrorist group gaining weapons.
Ultimately,
I do not see the need for Israel to maintain nuclear weapons. As of
now, I do not see any necessity for Israel to even use nuclear weapons.
First off, Israel has already proved itself quite dangerous with
conventional weapons. Secondly, any nuclear attack upon Israel would
almost certainly result in the full annihilation and overthrow of the
government of the perpetrating country. Thirdly, if Israel was foolhardy
enough to preemptively strike via nuclear weapons, they would become a
pariah state, even more than North Korea is. A deterrent force should
not require 2-3 weapons. Each one is capable of annihilating a city.
There is absolutely no need for Israel to develop more, let alone keep
most of the weapons they currently own. It would be a massive
image-building move in the international community, and would put the
onus on Iran to follow through with their pledge to not make nuclear
weapons.
What
is my solution to the Iran situation? Make it very clear that the US
will continue sanctions until the Iran nuclear program has been dealt
with. However, we must also do everything possible to come to a solution
to the nuclear situation. Let Netanyahu know that if he becomes the
extreme party he will be treated as such. And let Rouhani and Khameini
know that the US does not expect to be hoodwinked.
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